Cyclic patterns of changes in party dominance suggest a plausible hypothesis to account for historical data and to provide a background structure upon which shortterm effects such as economic conditions and the personality of leaders may be 
House and Senate elections. This distinction has given rise to ongoing disputes among US electoral scholars as to whether realignments must simultaneously happen in both presidential and congressional elections, or whether various lags must be built into the model for one or the other type of contest, or whether data from one type of contest is to be given definitional priority. Because Britain is a parliamentary system (and because only the lower chamber is elected) this type of problem of potentially conflicting sources of data on which to judge realignment does not arise. Second, and relatedly, because Britain is (or rather, at least until very recently was) a unitary system, in looking at realignment in Britain we do not need to worry about the vexing problem of differences in how realignments play out in the various state legislatures as compared to the national parliament. In one important way, however, the US and the UK are similar: both use single-member districts with first-past-the-post balloting. We believe it is striking that we find party cycles of similar length and pattern in the US and the UK, despite the conventional view that the party system of the US is unlike that of virtually every other industrial society in that it does not feature highly disciplined parliamentary parties and, for the last 150 years, has had only two parties with strength in the legislature.
Our questions in this paper are twofold. First, do regular cycles in party strength occur in British politics -and if so what is the mean cycle length? Second, if such ebbing and flowing has occurred, what political forces might account for these patterns, and can we expect similar forces to have such effects in the future?
In the next section we describe the evidence about changing party strength over time in which we seek to discern cycles. We also address some important methodological questions, such as whether seats or votes should be used to evaluate party strength, how the transition from Liberal to Labour Party prominence (as well as other third party effects) should be handled, and how should endogeneity resulting from the power of governing parties to time elections to their advantage be dealt with. In the succeeding section we look at possible causes of the cycling we have found.
Evidence for Cycling

Party Seat-Share in the United Kingdom: 1832-2005
In Figure 1 , we present time-series plots of major-party Parliamentary strength in the United Kingdom over the period , which encompasses the full historical period to date since the expansion of the franchise that began with the Reform Act. 4 We focus on the Conservative Party, as it has persisted as a major party throughout the study The party distribution of nationally aggregate vote totals --as opposed to seat shares --suggests a somewhat different pattern, with the time series of vote totals displaying less regularity that that of seat shares. We believe that seat share is a more reliable indicator of party strength because seat share, not aggregate vote share, determines dominance in Parliament and hence is the ultimate goal of each party. In particular, the aggregate vote totals include many constituencies that were not contested, particularly before about 1910, or in which there was no serious contest 5 and in which the proportions of the constituency vote received by each party may be misleading. The single-member-district system in the United Kingdom leads inevitably to wasted votes in some constituencies and an inherent bias in the translation of votes into seats.
dominant periods by spectral analysis -the initial statistical method used below --because the analysis makes no claim about the cause of any patterns that may emerge. It simply determines whether a (dominant) periodicity exists, whatever its cause may be.
With regard to the length of periods, however, endogenous timing tends to exaggerate and potentially extend the strength shown by the governing party. A governing party suffering waning strength may be able to hang on until the end of its term, whereas a governing party experiencing temporary strong support in mid-term may call an election immediately in order to lock in a full additional term. These strategies may extend hegemony (half-cycles) a few years, but do not prevent an eventual reversal of fortune followed by control by the opposition party, which in turn may find the same opportunities to stretch its hegemony. Thus, the existence of cycles --and whatever rough regularity they may exhibit --appear unaffected by endogenous timing, although the length of cycles may be marginally increased. Calling elections when a government is perceived to be strong, furthermore, may increase the amplitude of each major party's performance relative to its mean performance (above the mean for the governing party and below the mean for the opposition).
A more significant difficulty in tracking and interpreting party support in the United Kingdom arises because of frequent splitting and reorganization of the parties, including major party coalitions. As early as 1846, the Conservatives split over repeal of 
Spectral analysis periodograms
In order to investigate possible periodicity in the seat and vote shares of the Conservative Party, we perform a spectral analysis -a procedure that decomposes the pattern of seat (or vote) shares over time into a spectrum of cycles of different lengths, just as a prism separates white light into a spectrum of colors of different wavelengths or frequencies. 8 The output of such an analysis is conventionally represented by a periodogram, a plot that emphasizes the dominant frequencies (or, alternatively, cycle lengths) that make up the time series spectrum. Specifically, a periodogram plots on the Y-axis the squared amplitude corresponding to a cycle length against that cycle length on the X-axis, i.e., the relative strength of the contribution of each associated frequency to the overall pattern of the time series. The peaks in the plot represent the strongest frequencies in the (Fourier) decomposition of the time series; reciprocals of these frequencies represent the corresponding strongest periods or cycle lengths reflected in the time series.
Because the time series of interpolated data is recorded every 4 years, each of these cycle lengths must be multiplied by 4 to obtain cycle lengths in years. Note that a "period" represents a complete cycle, such as a duration of Conservative ascendancy plus a duration of Liberal/Labour ascendancy, i.e., the time for the political landscape to return to a specified state. Hence the average duration that one party is in power is half a period as defined by the periodogram. Note that each position on a periodogram integrates information equally from the entire historical period. The x coordinate represents a cycle length (reciprocal of a frequency) while the y coordinate represents how strongly that cycle length is reflected in the pattern shown by the data.
Because our interest is in longer-duration periods, we first smooth the data, using a center-weighted moving average, defined by replacing each value by
. Smoothing depresses the amplitude of the shorter cycles, permitting any longer cycles to stand out; technically, this operation is called a low-pass filter, because it permits cycles of low frequency (i.e., longer cycles) to pass through. estimates remarkably similar to those we (and others) obtain for British elections.
23
Here, to account for why cycling might occur, we adapt the interaction model between voters and parties introduced by Merrill, Grofman, and Brunell 24 for American politics.
The Voter-Party Interaction Model
Our purpose is to model the political forces that can account for cycling in party The tradeoff implied by our first and second assumptions is embodied in equations 1-2 below.
Third, the party in power may enjoy an advantage in the next election -due in part to government control over election timing --that is independent of the spatial distance between party and voter positions (see equation 3 below). This assumption is consistent with the observations of a number of scholars who draw their inspiration largely from American politics. These scholars include Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., who found cycles in the liberal and conservative mood of the American polity and observed, 'As political eras, whether dominated by public purpose or private interest, run their course, they infallibly generate the desire for something different'. 32 Similarly, Stokes and Iversen 33 suggest several forces, in addition to movements of the business cycle, that tend to restore rather than disrupt party balance, including greater voter response to governmental mistakes than successes, ability of an out-party to make more flexible and extravagant promises, vulnerability of the in-party to splits as its majority grows, 34 alternating moods of liberalism and conservatism, and a popular belief in rotation in office. Bartels and Zaller, 35 who are analyzing American politics, suggest that the longer the out-party is out, the more likely it is to nominate appealing candidates, and suggest that voters may react over time to the party in power because innovative political leaders may give way to less skillful successors, seasoned advisers may burn out, and scandals accumulate, while the governing party faces increasingly intractable problems after dealing with the easier issues. In line with this approach, the thermostatic model associated with Wlezien 36 -a model that has been well supported in the United
States --suggests that voter preferences move counter to the ideological direction of the government, as voters react to governments that -pursuing their own ideological goalsfind themselves out of step with their constituents.
There seems no reason why the numerous homeostatic factors tending to promote 
Position of the Liberal/Labour Party at time t.
As the parties attempt to resolve the tension between their incentives to win vote share by moving toward the median voter 42 while at the same time advocating their preferred policy positions, the party movements may be modeled as:
where the terms and
represent the signed distance from the expected median voter position to the party position, α is the median convergence parameter, and β is the party policy-motivation parameter.
We assume that the Conservative vote share is the proportion of voters who are nearer the Conservative position, plus an in-party effect that aids the Conservatives when the model projects that they control the government and detracts when they do not.
Similarly the Conservative seat share is assumed determined by the proportion of voters who are nearer the Conservative position, plus an in-party effect that aids the Conservatives when -according to the model --they constitute a majority and detracts when they do not. Specifically, the (expected) Conservative seat share in the election is the quantity given by
where γ is the in-party advantage parameter and V σ is the standard deviation of the voter distribution. We assume that the voter distribution is normally distributed, where denotes the standard cumulative normal distribution function. Finally, the movement of the median voter away from the position of the incumbent party is modeled as:
where δ is the voter reaction parameter and The endogeneity problem discussed earlier is also relevant in the voter-interaction model. To avoid assessing the state of the system at time points determined endogenously, we perform model projections at equally-spaced time points as indicated above, even though the actual elections were not held in those years. We project the state of the system at these equally spaced time points, fitting the model by least squares deviations between the model projections and the interpolated actual election results.
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As we have noted, the fact that governing parties try to call elections at times when temporary effects are favorable to themselves suggests that there is an added benefit to incumbency beyond the traditional ones, so that the in-party (incumbency) parameter γ introduced above should be somewhat higher than it might be if governing parties had no control over election timing.
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Estimated parameters for the Full Model for seat share are presented in Table 2 ; model projections along with the empirical time series are presented in Figure 4A . Alternatively, fitting the model with no smoothing of either data or model projections yields parameter estimates that differ from those obtained with smoothing at most by 0.004 and generates estimates of cycle lengths of 27 years, the same as those obtained by using smoothed data (see Table 2 ). The model fit for unsmoothed data (using two-party seat share) is presented in Figure 4B and in general visually tracks the empirical time series; the corresponding plot (not shown) for all-party seats is similar. As expected, without smoothing, the sums of squared errors of the fitted models are substantially larger, while the correlations between observed and predicted values are smaller (0.68 and 0.69 for two-party seats and all-party seats, respectively), but still statistically significant.
Overall, both the data (smoothed or unsmoothed) and the model projections suggest a fairly regular pattern of cycles in Conservative strength, with a peak about 1840 before the split over the Corn Laws, a minor peak in the 1870s followed by a stronger one in the 1890s when the Liberals suffered splits, and a more extended but less regular peak in the 1920s and 1930s during the transition from the Liberals to Labour. Finally the plots portray a relatively weak peak in the 1950s and a strong peak in the 1980s during the Thatcher government.
Model Fit to British Election Data for the 1950-2005 Period Only
It can be instructive, as was suggested by one referee of an earlier version of this paper, to compare the empirical record during the past decades with the model projection.
The most recent Conservative electoral hegemony began with their rise to power in 1979.
Conservative seat share reached its peak in the mid 1980s, after which it declined with increasing rapidity amid disillusionment and scandal during the 1990s until Labour won a Detailed comparison between the empirical time series and model projections (based on unsmoothed data) for the post world war era -which includes the current cycle described above --are presented in Figure 5 . The plots illustrate that the model projections track the actual seat share rather closely throughout this era even without smoothing, except for a brief stretch around 1970. Furthermore, as illustrated in Figure A3 in the Web Appendix, since the mid-1960s the location of the median voter projected by the voter-party interaction model has closely tracked public preferences as estimated by Bartle, Dellepiane, and Stimson.
<<< FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE>>>
Comparison to Alternative Models
Are there alternative factors that might account for party patterns and that provide alternative/complementary explanations to the thermostatic approach we have made use of here? Initially, we confirmed that our four-parameter model does not achieve spurious fits to random data with correlations at all comparable to that obtained when fitted to real data, but that, on the other hand, even a reduced two-parameter voter-interaction model could be capable of approaching the fit we obtained with the full four-parameter version.
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Perhaps the most commonly mentioned substantive factor that might drive the political pattern is the national economy, either objectively measured or as perceived by The second contribution of the paper is to suggest how a parsimonious model of voter and party motivations and behavior can generate such a pattern of stable oscillation.
Our adaptation of the Merrill, Grofman, and Brunell 65 voter-party interaction model offers a plausible fit to the time series of Conservative Party seat share from 1832 to the present -a fit that is further improved by incorporating a dummy variable for the period of transition from Liberal to Labour prominence, which is taken to be 1916-1932. 66 That model incorporates party motivations to resolve a tradeoff between seat maximization and desired policy, the effects of in-party advantages (from both electoral prospects and election timing), and voter reaction to the party in power and to its policies to model cyclic patterns. The fit of this model is quite good, considering that there are more than 40 data points with only four parameters (and a choice of phase angle), and we can provide a better fit than either a model using only economic data or one that is purely autoregressive in form. Also, the voter-party interaction model suggests gradual rather than abrupt changes in party control and, as we have seen, the empirical record is compatible with this expectation.
The voter-interaction model offers a political mechanism that can help explain the observed oscillation of party strength as voters move away from the party in power while parties dance between their own preferences and those of the voters. Moreover, the cycles that our model implies are a natural part of the political process, rather than being driven solely by exogenous forces. Note that we are not claiming that the voter-party interaction model predicts the future in detail, but rather that a model generated from a few parameters estimated from historical data can describe a generally regular pattern over a long historical period and that that general pattern might be expected to persist.
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Of course, we would also emphasize that models such as ours are intended to provide baseline (cyclic) trends, but what happens in any given election period will depend upon factors that, by definition, are not in the long run historical model.
Given the differences between the US and Britain (e.g., a parliamentary system where incumbents can call new elections versus a presidential system with fixed election times, and dramatic differences in the historical importance of third parties), it is remarkable how similar our estimate of a full cycle averaging about 28 years is to the estimates of cycle length for American data such as those found by Merrill, Grofman, and Brunell 68 for president and the two houses of Congress. 69 But we also wish to address the claim that, in both the US and Britain, models of cycling, however useful for understanding historical patterns, are less relevant or even inappropriate today. In the US, many authors have noted a weakening of the strength of party identification as indicated by the growth in the number of those who identify as independents and the rise in split-ticket voting patterns, and various students of American politics have proposed that the notion of realignment be replaced with the idea of dealignment. Similarly, because of the relatively strong voting strength exhibited by the Liberal-Democrats in recent decades, and the rise of regional parties, it might seem that we are in a period in which the two major parties may be weakened in Britain, and so studying cycles of dominance between the two leading parties may be rather beside the point.
But, in the US, very recently, party identification has been on the rise and split ticket voting on the decline, and there is now strong evidence for the continuation of post-1932 realignment cycles, e.g., with 1994 one such inflection point. 70 Similarly, even as we recognize the importance of third (and fourth, etc. parties) in British politics, 71 there are good reasons to see the study of cycling as very much still relevant to understanding expected that Labour will lose the next general election, which must be held by May
Footnotes
1 Cycles of party dominance are only one among many important kinds of cyclic patterns we might find in politics, e.g., we may have cycles in the structure of ideological competition within a country, but in this essay we will limit ourselves to cycles in party dominance.
2 There are at least two key reasons that more seems to have been written about and theorized about party realignments and the possible cycling of party dominance in the US than about these phenomena in the rest of the democratic world put together. one dominant both in terms of votes and seats and in terms of defining the ideational structure of political competition --were seen as limited to the peculiarly US case of two-party competition. 3 We are deliberately not using the Laakso-Taagepera index to count how many parties there are, because it understates the importance of the third party for understanding outcomes in a first-past-the-post system (see, e.g., P. Taylor, G. Gudgin, and R. J. Johnston, 'The Geography 42 For simplicity of exposition, we will speak of movements relative to the median voter to denote movements relative to the expected value of the median voter distribution. 43 We assume that the standard deviation of the voter distribution is
, so that the preferred positions of the parties are located at +/-2 standard deviations from the center of the scale, which without loss of generality, we take to be zero. Calculations were done with a time increment of four years. 45 In succession, each parameter estimate was selected by a search procedure to generate the smallest sum of squared error for that parameter with other parameters temporarily fixed, and the procedure was repeated with each parameter until no change was observed in the estimated parameters to three decimal places. 46 An alternative would be to fit the model by least square deviations between the actual election results and interpolated model projections for the same actual election years. But this approach renders the model projections dependent on each individual actual election time-point and not just the model parameters. 47 Since the model parameters reflect the effect of the timing advantage, the governing party's seat/vote strength may be biased (over-predicted) by the model in years in which the government chose not to hold an election (such as years when it deemed that its electoral prospects were poor). The existence of cycles and their regularity as predicted by the model, however, should not be greatly affected by over-estimates of governing party strength (and hence under-estimates of opposition party strength) between elections. 48 The projected and empirical plots for all-party seat share are presented in Figure A1 Table 1A employ a low-pass filter; test statistics in Table 1B are 
